A concrete example
One unavailable signer need not block a correctly backed-up two-of-three arrangement.
In context
Separating signers can reduce dependence on one compromised or unavailable key. It also increases coordination and backup requirements. For Bitcoin, recovering a wallet may require its descriptor or equivalent script information in addition to sufficient private keys. Losing policy data can make recovery harder even when key material survives.
The related mechanism, visually
- 01Proposed transaction
- 02Independent signer review
- 03Required signatures
- 04Policy verified on spend
Read these as connected concepts, not necessarily consecutive steps.
Read the explanation
A multisignature policy requires several signatures under a defined rule. On Bitcoin this can be expressed through spending conditions; on smart-contract networks it may be implemented by wallet code. The threshold is only part of the design. Signer identities, transaction review and the ability to modify the policy also matter.
Put the mechanism into context
Compare 2-of-3 and 3-of-3 policies when one signer is unavailable. Then compare them when one signer is malicious. Make two columns: ability to spend legitimately and ability for the attacker to spend alone.
Apply it in the workshop →What this mechanism does not guarantee
Increasing the threshold can reduce unilateral action while making recovery harder. Multiple devices held by one person do not create organizational separation. Backups must preserve whatever public configuration is needed to reconstruct the wallet, and signers should review the same transaction rather than relying only on a coordinator’s summary.
Explore the full explanation
Multisig: policy, backups and recovery
A multisignature arrangement requires several signatures under a defined policy, such as two of three keys.